The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notion of intention in order to emphasize its significance for philosophical practice and explain its function in conjunction with related notions, such as purpose and narrative. I argue that the notion of intention plays an indispensable role in practicing philosophy, especially in a scientific and technological epoch in which most people do not take time to consider the purpose or meaning of their lives. This makes them rush their lives in total confusion and sometimes also resort to alcohol or drugs and even commit suicide. In section 1, I explain why we have to consider intention in philosophical practice. I start from Gertrude E. Anscombe’s theory of intention that discriminates three usages: intention to act, intention in acting, and intentional action. In section 2, I examine a teleological explanation of action as a basis for philosophical practice that focuses on intention. I introduce Georg H. von Wright’s model, which is based on a scheme of practical inference, and then point out its main problems that are related to formulate the relationship between intention and purpose, and suggest a revised model. In section 3, I combine the notions of intention, purpose, and counseling by discussing the narrative theory of Alasdair MacIntyre, and finally I suggest a teleological-narrative model of philosophical practice that is based on the combination of both models.

Key Terms: Intention, Reason, Telos, Embodied Mind, Practical Inference, Narrative